← Directory

Mayan Finance

Seal for Mayan Finance: onchain band C. Not claimed by the project.
Transparency score · worst track · not a security audit

mayan.finance · Other · Solana · data checked 2026-10-21 06:49 (Stockholm)

Contact route: not found

Not claimed Automated from public data

Automated score · 2026-10-21 · method v0.2.7 · How this score is made
Produced automatically from public data on 2026-10-21 (method v0.2.7). It shows how much of this project’s control structure, code and contact information could be checked from public sources. No person selected or adjusted it, and nothing a project does or pays changes it. It is not a security audit.

Beta: the method is still being calibrated, so this automated score may contain errors. Send a correction.

Transparency score, not a security audit. Scores are generated automatically from public data (Solana RPC, OtterSec build registry, GitHub, project websites). Projects are not involved unless a page is marked “Claimed”, and claiming never changes a score. Nothing here says a project is safe. How scores are made → · Corrections, right of reply & opt-out →

C
Onchain track · onchain v0.2.7
64/100 · Band C
coverage 95 % · 37 of 39 decided
1 unknown (−1.5 pts) · 1 not read (no points lost, lowers coverage) · 10 not built yet (excluded)
A single key (or a 1-of-N multisig) can change the program or token. See “Contract control”.

Something wrong on this page? Dispute a check or send a correction · opt-out. We re-run the check and correct the page.

What was checked: addresses & sources

Website mayan.finance · GitHub https://github.com/mayan-finance. Addresses are used only if they appear verbatim on an official project page.

Programs taken from the project's own official address list or repository (process v1, docs/program-discovery-process.md); each exists on mainnet as an executable program.

Onchain track

Contract control weight 305.6/30
  • ◐ Partial

    Upgrade authority mayan3…

    Upgrade authority is 9fvAtDbPiAsuhRmkgp9fxDYeWEHfEBY2twVtXT4d3TTn: Squads v3 multisig EtqE9E7W… with threshold 5 of 9 voting member(s) (9 total) (established by re-deriving the vault address from the multisig; found in upgrade history tx dGMTQtiS…). Member independence not established. Address taken from official source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts
    docs.mayan.finance ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 2f6902d1e0e8… sha256 ad30e907252b…
    What would show up as met
    • If the program is final, revoke the upgrade authority. It then reads as immutable.
    • Otherwise move the authority to a multisig or a DAO. For a multisig, use a threshold of at least 2, add a time lock, and do not keep a separate config authority that can change members without a vote.
    • Publish the multisig or DAO address on your own website so the page and the on-chain account can be tied together.

    How we check: We read the program’s upgrade authority on Solana (public RPC) and recognise Squads, Serum-style multisigs and SPL Governance accounts. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.

  • ✕ Not met

    Build matches source (OtterSec registry) mayan3…

    OtterSec registry answered: no build was ever submitted for this program (no submission).
    OtterSec registry ↗OtterSec registry ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 d12a460cf74c… sha256 4f53cda18c2b…
    What would show up as met
    • Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (solana-verify).
    • Submit the build to the registry so that it appears in the OtterSec registry (verify.osec.io). The check reads that registry; it does not rebuild anything itself.

    How we check: We ask the OtterSec build registry (verify.osec.io, a third party) whether the deployed program matches a build from the public source. We report what the registry says; we do not rebuild or vouch for anything ourselves. Any registry entry that matches the program’s current on-chain hash counts, not only the registry’s default entry (method 0.2.5). This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.

  • ◐ Partial

    Upgrade authority BLZRi6…

    Upgrade authority is CdzQ3EsNGEzu5K9w1RG9m1rPW6gbckV823VWDJ9ghkdr: Squads v3 multisig HDiwhb3i… with threshold 5 of 8 voting member(s) (8 total) (established by re-deriving the vault address from the multisig; found in upgrade history tx 23HeQ5ya…). Member independence not established. Address taken from official source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts
    docs.mayan.finance ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 0c0d7de493c1… sha256 0c2b99f92d4b…
    What would show up as met
    • If the program is final, revoke the upgrade authority. It then reads as immutable.
    • Otherwise move the authority to a multisig or a DAO. For a multisig, use a threshold of at least 2, add a time lock, and do not keep a separate config authority that can change members without a vote.
    • Publish the multisig or DAO address on your own website so the page and the on-chain account can be tied together.

    How we check: We read the program’s upgrade authority on Solana (public RPC) and recognise Squads, Serum-style multisigs and SPL Governance accounts. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.

  • ✕ Not met

    Build matches source (OtterSec registry) BLZRi6…

    OtterSec registry answered: no build was ever submitted for this program (no submission).
    OtterSec registry ↗OtterSec registry ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 d12a460cf74c… sha256 4f53cda18c2b…
    What would show up as met
    • Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (solana-verify).
    • Submit the build to the registry so that it appears in the OtterSec registry (verify.osec.io). The check reads that registry; it does not rebuild anything itself.

    How we check: We ask the OtterSec build registry (verify.osec.io, a third party) whether the deployed program matches a build from the public source. We report what the registry says; we do not rebuild or vouch for anything ourselves. Any registry entry that matches the program’s current on-chain hash counts, not only the registry’s default entry (method 0.2.5). This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.

  • ◐ Partial

    Upgrade authority dkpZqr…

    Upgrade authority is CdzQ3EsNGEzu5K9w1RG9m1rPW6gbckV823VWDJ9ghkdr: Squads v3 multisig HDiwhb3i… with threshold 5 of 8 voting member(s) (8 total) (established by re-deriving the vault address from the multisig; found in upgrade history tx fF9wNkou…). Member independence not established. Address taken from official source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts
    docs.mayan.finance ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 909528237cb3… sha256 d30e4287c8ab…
    What would show up as met
    • If the program is final, revoke the upgrade authority. It then reads as immutable.
    • Otherwise move the authority to a multisig or a DAO. For a multisig, use a threshold of at least 2, add a time lock, and do not keep a separate config authority that can change members without a vote.
    • Publish the multisig or DAO address on your own website so the page and the on-chain account can be tied together.

    How we check: We read the program’s upgrade authority on Solana (public RPC) and recognise Squads, Serum-style multisigs and SPL Governance accounts. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.

  • ✕ Not met

    Build matches source (OtterSec registry) dkpZqr…

    OtterSec registry answered: no build was ever submitted for this program (no submission).
    OtterSec registry ↗OtterSec registry ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 d12a460cf74c… sha256 4f53cda18c2b…
    What would show up as met
    • Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (solana-verify).
    • Submit the build to the registry so that it appears in the OtterSec registry (verify.osec.io). The check reads that registry; it does not rebuild anything itself.

    How we check: We ask the OtterSec build registry (verify.osec.io, a third party) whether the deployed program matches a build from the public source. We report what the registry says; we do not rebuild or vouch for anything ourselves. Any registry entry that matches the program’s current on-chain hash counts, not only the registry’s default entry (method 0.2.5). This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.

  • ◐ Partial

    Upgrade authority Gx9riv…

    Upgrade authority is CdzQ3EsNGEzu5K9w1RG9m1rPW6gbckV823VWDJ9ghkdr: Squads v3 multisig HDiwhb3i… with threshold 5 of 8 voting member(s) (8 total) (established by re-deriving the vault address from the multisig; found in upgrade history tx 3C5hszJB…). Member independence not established. Address taken from official source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts
    docs.mayan.finance ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 df8609c960cd… sha256 36b8616f40d5…
    What would show up as met
    • If the program is final, revoke the upgrade authority. It then reads as immutable.
    • Otherwise move the authority to a multisig or a DAO. For a multisig, use a threshold of at least 2, add a time lock, and do not keep a separate config authority that can change members without a vote.
    • Publish the multisig or DAO address on your own website so the page and the on-chain account can be tied together.

    How we check: We read the program’s upgrade authority on Solana (public RPC) and recognise Squads, Serum-style multisigs and SPL Governance accounts. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.

  • ✕ Not met

    Build matches source (OtterSec registry) Gx9riv…

    OtterSec registry answered: no build was ever submitted for this program (no submission).
    OtterSec registry ↗OtterSec registry ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 d12a460cf74c… sha256 4f53cda18c2b…
    What would show up as met
    • Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (solana-verify).
    • Submit the build to the registry so that it appears in the OtterSec registry (verify.osec.io). The check reads that registry; it does not rebuild anything itself.

    How we check: We ask the OtterSec build registry (verify.osec.io, a third party) whether the deployed program matches a build from the public source. We report what the registry says; we do not rebuild or vouch for anything ourselves. Any registry entry that matches the program’s current on-chain hash counts, not only the registry’s default entry (method 0.2.5). This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.

  • ✕ Not met

    Upgrade authority 8QJmxZ…

    Upgrade authority is EU8z368kxJ4VzLfdpNG774L6DpAnav9d9cBBpbyH9Rr2: a single key (on-curve address). On Solana, the holder of this key can upgrade the program. Address taken from official source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts
    docs.mayan.finance ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 89565c98d486… sha256 83cf6f5251a6…
    What would show up as met
    • If the program is final, revoke the upgrade authority. It then reads as immutable.
    • Otherwise move the authority to a multisig or a DAO. For a multisig, use a threshold of at least 2, add a time lock, and do not keep a separate config authority that can change members without a vote.
    • Publish the multisig or DAO address on your own website so the page and the on-chain account can be tied together.

    How we check: We read the program’s upgrade authority on Solana (public RPC) and recognise Squads, Serum-style multisigs and SPL Governance accounts. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.

  • ✕ Not met

    Build matches source (OtterSec registry) 8QJmxZ…

    OtterSec registry answered: no build was ever submitted for this program (no submission).
    OtterSec registry ↗OtterSec registry ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 d12a460cf74c… sha256 4f53cda18c2b…
    What would show up as met
    • Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (solana-verify).
    • Submit the build to the registry so that it appears in the OtterSec registry (verify.osec.io). The check reads that registry; it does not rebuild anything itself.

    How we check: We ask the OtterSec build registry (verify.osec.io, a third party) whether the deployed program matches a build from the public source. We report what the registry says; we do not rebuild or vouch for anything ourselves. Any registry entry that matches the program’s current on-chain hash counts, not only the registry’s default entry (method 0.2.5). This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.

  • ◐ Partial

    Upgrade authority FC4eXx…

    Upgrade authority is CdzQ3EsNGEzu5K9w1RG9m1rPW6gbckV823VWDJ9ghkdr: Squads v3 multisig HDiwhb3i… with threshold 5 of 8 voting member(s) (8 total) (established by re-deriving the vault address from the multisig; found in upgrade history tx 3GdRdzmv…). Member independence not established. Address taken from official source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts
    docs.mayan.finance ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 9f580441d4b5… sha256 0722ec1ba514…
    What would show up as met
    • If the program is final, revoke the upgrade authority. It then reads as immutable.
    • Otherwise move the authority to a multisig or a DAO. For a multisig, use a threshold of at least 2, add a time lock, and do not keep a separate config authority that can change members without a vote.
    • Publish the multisig or DAO address on your own website so the page and the on-chain account can be tied together.

    How we check: We read the program’s upgrade authority on Solana (public RPC) and recognise Squads, Serum-style multisigs and SPL Governance accounts. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.

  • ✕ Not met

    Build matches source (OtterSec registry) FC4eXx…

    OtterSec registry answered: no build was ever submitted for this program (no submission).
    OtterSec registry ↗OtterSec registry ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 d12a460cf74c… sha256 4f53cda18c2b…
    What would show up as met
    • Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (solana-verify).
    • Submit the build to the registry so that it appears in the OtterSec registry (verify.osec.io). The check reads that registry; it does not rebuild anything itself.

    How we check: We ask the OtterSec build registry (verify.osec.io, a third party) whether the deployed program matches a build from the public source. We report what the registry says; we do not rebuild or vouch for anything ourselves. Any registry entry that matches the program’s current on-chain hash counts, not only the registry’s default entry (method 0.2.5). This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.

  • ◐ Partial

    Upgrade authority 5VtQHn…

    Upgrade authority is CdzQ3EsNGEzu5K9w1RG9m1rPW6gbckV823VWDJ9ghkdr: Squads v3 multisig HDiwhb3i… with threshold 5 of 8 voting member(s) (8 total) (established by re-deriving the vault address from the multisig; found in upgrade history tx 46k5bmdw…). Member independence not established. Address taken from official source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts
    docs.mayan.finance ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 ac5c5b8c1ae9… sha256 06d84e34a60e…
    What would show up as met
    • If the program is final, revoke the upgrade authority. It then reads as immutable.
    • Otherwise move the authority to a multisig or a DAO. For a multisig, use a threshold of at least 2, add a time lock, and do not keep a separate config authority that can change members without a vote.
    • Publish the multisig or DAO address on your own website so the page and the on-chain account can be tied together.

    How we check: We read the program’s upgrade authority on Solana (public RPC) and recognise Squads, Serum-style multisigs and SPL Governance accounts. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.

  • ✕ Not met

    Build matches source (OtterSec registry) 5VtQHn…

    OtterSec registry answered: no build was ever submitted for this program (no submission).
    OtterSec registry ↗OtterSec registry ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 d12a460cf74c… sha256 4f53cda18c2b…
    What would show up as met
    • Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (solana-verify).
    • Submit the build to the registry so that it appears in the OtterSec registry (verify.osec.io). The check reads that registry; it does not rebuild anything itself.

    How we check: We ask the OtterSec build registry (verify.osec.io, a third party) whether the deployed program matches a build from the public source. We report what the registry says; we do not rebuild or vouch for anything ourselves. Any registry entry that matches the program’s current on-chain hash counts, not only the registry’s default entry (method 0.2.5). This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.

  • ✕ Not met

    Upgrade authority GFRP4y…

    Upgrade authority is 5aaHPox5ZCfxEzxgtzwbEk2DtqMG3JrnnQbqbPuyev6y: a single key (on-curve address). On Solana, the holder of this key can upgrade the program. Address taken from official source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts
    docs.mayan.finance ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 6aeb312f19c9… sha256 ca58acdc5a05…
    What would show up as met
    • If the program is final, revoke the upgrade authority. It then reads as immutable.
    • Otherwise move the authority to a multisig or a DAO. For a multisig, use a threshold of at least 2, add a time lock, and do not keep a separate config authority that can change members without a vote.
    • Publish the multisig or DAO address on your own website so the page and the on-chain account can be tied together.

    How we check: We read the program’s upgrade authority on Solana (public RPC) and recognise Squads, Serum-style multisigs and SPL Governance accounts. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.

  • ✕ Not met

    Build matches source (OtterSec registry) GFRP4y…

    OtterSec registry answered: no build was ever submitted for this program (no submission).
    OtterSec registry ↗OtterSec registry ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 d12a460cf74c… sha256 4f53cda18c2b…
    What would show up as met
    • Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (solana-verify).
    • Submit the build to the registry so that it appears in the OtterSec registry (verify.osec.io). The check reads that registry; it does not rebuild anything itself.

    How we check: We ask the OtterSec build registry (verify.osec.io, a third party) whether the deployed program matches a build from the public source. We report what the registry says; we do not rebuild or vouch for anything ourselves. Any registry entry that matches the program’s current on-chain hash counts, not only the registry’s default entry (method 0.2.5). This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.

  • – N/A

    Mint/freeze authority

    No token mint submitted.
    source: calculated from the other checks checked 2026-10-21
Audits weight 1515/15
  • ✓ Met

    Audits found at official sources

    Discovered automatically (method 0.2.2): page https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/audits names OtterSec, Sec3. Rated partial: found at the project's own GitHub organisation or website and naming OtterSec, Sec3, but the program ID was not found in the readable text (PDF text is parsed when possible). Date vs. last upgrade not checked. Quality, scope and findings not assessed. Searched: GitHub mayan-finance: 15 of 15 non-fork repositories file-listed via GitHub API | mayan.finance: 19 audit/security page address(es) fetched (docs sub-domains and homepage audit links included). Counted as Met (method 0.2.4): audits by at least 2 distinct firms (ottersec, sec3) were found at official sources of the project; the program ID is not required in that case. Quality, scope and date still not assessed.
    docs.mayan.finance ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 8146a886a736…
Code openness weight 15 · 1 not read15/15
  • ✓ Met

    Public repository

    mayan-finance/swap-sdk public, created 2022-10-14, 9 contributor(s) (count only).
    GitHub ↗api.github.com ↗api.github.com ↗api.github.com ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 22890e757b7e… sha256 714e3b360bab…
  • ✓ Met

    Licence

    SPDX: MIT.
    GitHub ↗api.github.com ↗api.github.com ↗api.github.com ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 22890e757b7e… sha256 714e3b360bab…
  • ✓ Met

    Activity last 90 days

    Last push 2026-10-20 (0 d ago), latest across the mayan-finance organisation's non-fork repositories.
    GitHub ↗api.github.com ↗api.github.com ↗api.github.com ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 22890e757b7e… sha256 714e3b360bab…
  • ⊘ Not read

    On-chain program source public

    Program ID not found in the submitted repo or the security.txt source_code repo. Source may exist elsewhere — counted as unknown, not as closed. Repos searched (shallow clone, text search for the program ID): https://github.com/https://github.com/mayan-finance (clone failed). Does not prove the deployed binary matches (see the build check). (reason: unreadable)
    GitHub ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo) checked 2026-10-21 sha256 f24854594578…
    What would show up as met

    Nothing for the project to do. Our checker could not read the source this time, so the check is “Not read”: no points are lost. It is tried again at the next run. If you think the data behind it is wrong, send a correction.

Onchain history weight 1010/10
  • ✓ Met

    Last deploy mayan3…

    Last deploy 2026-07-10 (102 d ago).
    Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21 sha256 2f6902d1e0e8… sha256 ad30e907252b…
  • ○ Not built

    Program age / upgrade count mayan3…

    Full history scan (first deploy, upgrades in 30 d, authority changes) needs an indexer (e.g. Helius); not available on public RPC.
    Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21 sha256 2f6902d1e0e8… sha256 ad30e907252b…
  • ✓ Met

    Last deploy BLZRi6…

    Last deploy 2025-11-23 (331 d ago).
    Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21 sha256 0c0d7de493c1… sha256 0c2b99f92d4b…
  • ○ Not built

    Program age / upgrade count BLZRi6…

    Full history scan (first deploy, upgrades in 30 d, authority changes) needs an indexer (e.g. Helius); not available on public RPC.
    Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21 sha256 0c0d7de493c1… sha256 0c2b99f92d4b…
  • ✓ Met

    Last deploy dkpZqr…

    Last deploy 2025-10-07 (378 d ago).
    Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21 sha256 909528237cb3… sha256 d30e4287c8ab…
  • ○ Not built

    Program age / upgrade count dkpZqr…

    Full history scan (first deploy, upgrades in 30 d, authority changes) needs an indexer (e.g. Helius); not available on public RPC.
    Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21 sha256 909528237cb3… sha256 d30e4287c8ab…
  • ✓ Met

    Last deploy Gx9riv…

    Last deploy 2025-12-06 (318 d ago).
    Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21 sha256 df8609c960cd… sha256 36b8616f40d5…
  • ○ Not built

    Program age / upgrade count Gx9riv…

    Full history scan (first deploy, upgrades in 30 d, authority changes) needs an indexer (e.g. Helius); not available on public RPC.
    Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21 sha256 df8609c960cd… sha256 36b8616f40d5…
  • ✓ Met

    Last deploy 8QJmxZ…

    Last deploy 2025-06-29 (478 d ago).
    Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getBlockTime)OtterSec registry ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 89565c98d486… sha256 83cf6f5251a6…
  • ○ Not built

    Program age / upgrade count 8QJmxZ…

    Full history scan (first deploy, upgrades in 30 d, authority changes) needs an indexer (e.g. Helius); not available on public RPC.
    Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getBlockTime)OtterSec registry ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 89565c98d486… sha256 83cf6f5251a6…
  • ✓ Met

    Last deploy FC4eXx…

    Last deploy 2025-07-23 (455 d ago).
    Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21 sha256 9f580441d4b5… sha256 0722ec1ba514…
  • ○ Not built

    Program age / upgrade count FC4eXx…

    Full history scan (first deploy, upgrades in 30 d, authority changes) needs an indexer (e.g. Helius); not available on public RPC.
    Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21 sha256 9f580441d4b5… sha256 0722ec1ba514…
  • ✓ Met

    Last deploy 5VtQHn…

    Last deploy 2026-07-28 (84 d ago).
    Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21 sha256 ac5c5b8c1ae9… sha256 06d84e34a60e…
  • ○ Not built

    Program age / upgrade count 5VtQHn…

    Full history scan (first deploy, upgrades in 30 d, authority changes) needs an indexer (e.g. Helius); not available on public RPC.
    Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21 sha256 ac5c5b8c1ae9… sha256 06d84e34a60e…
  • ✓ Met

    Last deploy GFRP4y…

    Last deploy 2026-08-31 (51 d ago).
    Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getBlockTime)OtterSec registry ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 6aeb312f19c9… sha256 ca58acdc5a05…
  • ○ Not built

    Program age / upgrade count GFRP4y…

    Full history scan (first deploy, upgrades in 30 d, authority changes) needs an indexer (e.g. Helius); not available on public RPC.
    Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getBlockTime)OtterSec registry ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 6aeb312f19c9… sha256 ca58acdc5a05…
Team & contact weight 15 · 1 unknown5/15
  • ✕ Not met

    Security contact (security.txt)

    No valid security.txt at /.well-known/security.txt or /security.txt (404).
    mayan.finance ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 e290fff99da6…
    What would show up as met
    • Publish a text file at https://your-domain/.well-known/security.txt (or /security.txt) with a Contact: line, for example Contact: mailto:security@your-domain.
    • RFC 9116 also asks for an Expires: line. We look only for Contact:, but add Expires: too so the file stays correct.

    How we check: We fetch the two standard locations over HTTPS. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.

  • ? Unknown

    Bug bounty programme linked

    No bug-bounty link found on homepage (raw + rendered), sitemap or security.txt. Not checked deeper (docs sites, Immunefi search) — counted as unknown, not as missing. Also checked: Immunefi public list: no active programme matched; no on-chain security.txt in mayan3…; no on-chain security.txt in BLZRi6…; no on-chain security.txt in dkpZqr…; no on-chain security.txt in Gx9riv…; no on-chain security.txt in 8QJmxZ…; no on-chain security.txt in FC4eXx…; no on-chain security.txt in 5VtQHn…; no on-chain security.txt in GFRP4y….
    mayan.finance ↗mayan.finance ↗mayan.finance ↗mayan.finance ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 0ad342902d30… sha256 e290fff99da6…
    What would show up as met
    • Link your bug bounty (for example an Immunefi, HackerOne or Cantina page, or a /bug-bounty page of your own) from the homepage, the sitemap or your security.txt.
    • “Unknown” here means we found no link. It does not mean you have no programme.

    How we check: We look at the homepage links (also as rendered in a browser), sitemap.xml and security.txt, and at Immunefi’s public list for on-chain security.txt names. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.

  • ℹ Status only

    Claimed / not claimed

    Status only, not scored: claiming proves control of an authority, domain or GitHub organisation and never changes a score. The status is shown in the page header.
    source: calculated from the other checks checked 2026-10-21
  • ○ Not built

    Team declared (voluntary, with consent)

    Team declaration + consent flow not built — excluded.
    source: calculated from the other checks checked 2026-10-21
  • ℹ Status only

    Components declared complete by the project

    Status only, not scored (it used to be scored, which made pages that are not claimed systematically lower; removed 2026-10-15). Other programs/packages may exist that were not submitted.
    source: calculated from the other checks checked 2026-10-21
  • ✕ Not met

    Program embeds security.txt

    0/8 own program(s) embed a solana-security-txt block with contacts.
    Explorer ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 f24854594578…
    What would show up as met
    • Embed a security.txt block in the program with the solana-security-txt crate: name, project_url, contacts and policy. Redeploy to publish it.
    • This also tells us which programs belong to you, and which are shared programs that do not.

    How we check: We read the program account on Solana (public RPC). This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.

  • ✓ Met

    Official program address list

    mayan3… published on project domain (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); BLZRi6… published on project domain (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); dkpZqr… published on project domain (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); Gx9riv… published on project domain (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); 8QJmxZ… published on project domain (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); FC4eXx… published on project domain (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); 5VtQHn… published on project domain (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); GFRP4y… published on project domain (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts).
    docs.mayan.finance ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 82f8ee5b6938…
Domain weight 54.4/5
  • ✓ Met

    HTTPS

    https://mayan.finance answered HTTP 200 over TLS.
    mayan.finance ↗mayan.finance ↗mayan.finance ↗mayan.finance ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 0ad342902d30… sha256 e290fff99da6…
  • ◐ Partial

    Security headers

    Present: X-Content-Type-Options. Missing: HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options.
    mayan.finance ↗mayan.finance ↗mayan.finance ↗mayan.finance ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 0ad342902d30… sha256 e290fff99da6…
    What would show up as met
    • Send these four response headers on your homepage: Strict-Transport-Security, Content-Security-Policy, X-Content-Type-Options and X-Frame-Options.
    • The check looks only at whether each header is present, not how strict it is.

    How we check: We read the headers of one homepage request. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.

  • ✓ Met

    Domain age

    Registered 2022-01-17 (~1737 d), source: RDAP (rdap.org). Registrant data ignored.
    RDAP ↗ checked 2026-10-21 sha256 eaf2124f455c…
  • ✓ Met

    Domain ↔ components consistency

    Linked: address mayan3… published on mayan.finance (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); address BLZRi6… published on mayan.finance (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); address dkpZqr… published on mayan.finance (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); address Gx9riv… published on mayan.finance (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); address 8QJmxZ… published on mayan.finance (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); address FC4eXx… published on mayan.finance (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); address 5VtQHn… published on mayan.finance (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); address GFRP4y… published on mayan.finance (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); GitHub repo linked from homepage; GitHub org name matches domain (weak)
    source: calculated from the other checks checked 2026-10-21

Snapshot hash of monitored fields: f504e9cfba853732

AI summaries

Generated with Grok 4.7 (xAI), Claude sonnet-5-5 (Anthropic) and GPT-6.1-sol (OpenAI) via their APIs. xAI, Anthropic and OpenAI have not reviewed, approved or sponsored Recheckable. AI-generated text; models see only extracted check results, never project-supplied text or personal names. They do not affect the score. Some text on this site (summaries and reports) is AI-generated and labelled where it appears. Scores and check results come from fixed code, not from AI. Scores are produced automatically from public data and are not reviewed by hand before they are shown; cases that the automatic checks flag are held for a person.

Template summary (deterministic)

Onchain track: band C (64/100, coverage 95 %, onchain v0.2.7). Strongest: Audits, Code openness, Onchain history, Legal documents, Domain. Weakest: Contract control, Team & contact. 1 check(s) unknown (each costs 1.5 points); 1 not read (no points lost, lowers coverage); 10 not built yet (excluded).

Regulatory information

The project has not declared any regulated-activity types, so no rules are listed.

Law firms (free listing, alphabetical, no ranking)

  • Delphi — Stockholm, Blockchain law (self-described)
  • Gernandt & Danielsson — Stockholm, Fintech (self-described)
  • Magnusson — Stockholm, Fintech (self-described)
  • Mannheimer Swartling — Stockholm, Fintech (own practice page to be confirmed) (self-described)
  • Setterwalls — Stockholm, Fintech (self-described)
  • Vinge — Stockholm, MiCA (own practice page to be confirmed) (self-described)

Recheckable has no financial relationship with the listed firms and receives no fee per contact. Paid placements, if ever introduced, are marked “Ad” and never shown next to low scores.

Score history

Automated score at each published review, newest on the right. The line steps at the date of a review; between reviews the score is unchanged.

Score historyTransparency score by published review for Mayan Finance. offchain track: 2026-10-16 30/100 onchain track (dashed): 2026-10-16 44/100, 2026-10-17 58/100, 2026-10-19 58/100, 2026-10-20 64/100, 2026-10-21 64/10002550751002026-10-162026-10-21

Solid line: offchain track. Dashed line: onchain track. ◆ = the method changed at that review.

◆ 2026-10-17: the scoring method changed from v0.2.1 to v0.2.5. A score change at that point can come from the method and not from the project.

◆ 2026-10-19: the scoring method changed from v0.2.5 to v0.2.6. A score change at that point can come from the method and not from the project.

◆ 2026-10-21: the scoring method changed from v0.2.6 to v0.2.7. A score change at that point can come from the method and not from the project.

Data table
ReviewTrackScoreGradeCoverageMethod
2026-10-16offchain30/100no grade67 %v0.2.1
2026-10-16onchain44/100D95 %v0.2.1
2026-10-17onchain58/100C95 %v0.2.5
2026-10-19onchain58/100C95 %v0.2.6
2026-10-20onchain64/100C95 %v0.2.6
2026-10-21onchain64/100C95 %v0.2.7

Check changes between reviews

History

  1. 2026-10-21 06:49
    Forced fresh run (same result; fresh evidence snapshots): onchain C (64, coverage 95 %)
  2. 2026-10-20 20:39
    Nightly re-run: onchain C (64, coverage 95 %)
  3. 2026-10-19 13:34
    Forced fresh run (same result; fresh evidence snapshots): onchain C (58, coverage 95 %)
  4. 2026-10-18 08:10
    Method 0.2.4: audits by 2+ distinct firms at official sources count as Met; an unreadable token mint is Not read. Re-scored from the stored checks, no new data.
  5. 2026-10-17 06:19
    Nightly re-run: onchain C (51, coverage 95 %)
  6. 2026-10-16 14:25
    Nightly re-run: onchain D (44, coverage 95 %)
  7. 2026-10-16 12:59
    Initial automatic review (indexed): offchain insufficient data (30, coverage 67 %)

Project's own statements and reply

No reply published. Claimed projects can add their own statements and a reply next to any check — dispute a check or reply. These statements are shown beside the automated score and never change it.
Does your team control the upgrade authority, official domain or GitHub organisation of this project? Claim this page (free, about a minute; it never changes a score).

For project owners: badge

Recheckable: onchain band C, Active

Status: Active. The badge says “no changes since review”, never “safe”.

Badges are for claimed projects. The embed code is available after the page has been claimed (free, about a minute; claiming never changes the score). Claim this page

Re-checks are rate-limited (once per 10 minutes). Restoring a grey badge requires a full review.