Mayan Finance
mayan.finance · Other · Solana · data checked 2026-10-21 06:49 (Stockholm)
Contact route: not found
Not claimed Automated from public data
Produced automatically from public data on 2026-10-21 (method v0.2.7). It shows how much of this project’s control structure, code and contact information could be checked from public sources. No person selected or adjusted it, and nothing a project does or pays changes it. It is not a security audit.
Beta: the method is still being calibrated, so this automated score may contain errors. Send a correction.
Transparency score, not a security audit. Scores are generated automatically from public data (Solana RPC, OtterSec build registry, GitHub, project websites). Projects are not involved unless a page is marked “Claimed”, and claiming never changes a score. Nothing here says a project is safe. How scores are made → · Corrections, right of reply & opt-out →
- Onchain: strongest Audits; weakest Contract control; missing data in Code openness, Team & contact.
Something wrong on this page? Dispute a check or send a correction · opt-out. We re-run the check and correct the page.
What was checked: addresses & sources
mayan34VedncxdK2XobtvWFDXQASUTBXhUVzt2kKgny(program) — source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contractsBLZRi6frs4X4DNLw56V4EXai1b6QVESN1BhHBTYM9VcY(program) — source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contractsdkpZqrxHFrhziEMQ931GLtfy11nFkCsfMftH9u6QwBU(program) — source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contractsGx9rivpS3YR8pBFwMuP6omYqVxunpLvLkNn7ubNyuZZ5(program) — source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts8QJmxZcEzwuYmCPy6XqgN2sHcYCcFq6AEfBMJZZuLo5a(program) — source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contractsFC4eXxkyrMPTjiYUpp4EAnkmwMbQyZ6NDCh1kfLn6vsf(program) — source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts5VtQHnhs2pfVEr68qQsbTRwKh4JV5GTu9mBHgHFxpHeQ(program) — source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contractsGFRP4yXUjvcQemf2zRJN8w9sPNaDk5PyBUQdPHD1AzLp(program) — source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts
Website mayan.finance · GitHub https://github.com/mayan-finance. Addresses are used only if they appear verbatim on an official project page.
Programs taken from the project's own official address list or repository (process v1, docs/program-discovery-process.md); each exists on mainnet as an executable program.
Onchain track
Contract control weight 305.6/30
- ◐ Partial
Upgrade authority mayan3…
Upgrade authority is 9fvAtDbPiAsuhRmkgp9fxDYeWEHfEBY2twVtXT4d3TTn: Squads v3 multisig EtqE9E7W… with threshold 5 of 9 voting member(s) (9 total) (established by re-deriving the vault address from the multisig; found in upgrade history tx dGMTQtiS…). Member independence not established. Address taken from official source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contractsdocs.mayan.finance ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗ checked 2026-10-21sha256 2f6902d1e0e8…sha256 ad30e907252b…What would show up as met
- If the program is final, revoke the upgrade authority. It then reads as immutable.
- Otherwise move the authority to a multisig or a DAO. For a multisig, use a threshold of at least 2, add a time lock, and do not keep a separate config authority that can change members without a vote.
- Publish the multisig or DAO address on your own website so the page and the on-chain account can be tied together.
How we check: We read the program’s upgrade authority on Solana (public RPC) and recognise Squads, Serum-style multisigs and SPL Governance accounts. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.
- ✕ Not met
Build matches source (OtterSec registry) mayan3…
OtterSec registry answered: no build was ever submitted for this program (no submission).What would show up as met
- Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (
solana-verify). - Submit the build to the registry so that it appears in the OtterSec registry (verify.osec.io). The check reads that registry; it does not rebuild anything itself.
How we check: We ask the OtterSec build registry (verify.osec.io, a third party) whether the deployed program matches a build from the public source. We report what the registry says; we do not rebuild or vouch for anything ourselves. Any registry entry that matches the program’s current on-chain hash counts, not only the registry’s default entry (method 0.2.5). This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.
- Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (
- ◐ Partial
Upgrade authority BLZRi6…
Upgrade authority is CdzQ3EsNGEzu5K9w1RG9m1rPW6gbckV823VWDJ9ghkdr: Squads v3 multisig HDiwhb3i… with threshold 5 of 8 voting member(s) (8 total) (established by re-deriving the vault address from the multisig; found in upgrade history tx 23HeQ5ya…). Member independence not established. Address taken from official source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contractsdocs.mayan.finance ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗ checked 2026-10-21sha256 0c0d7de493c1…sha256 0c2b99f92d4b…What would show up as met
- If the program is final, revoke the upgrade authority. It then reads as immutable.
- Otherwise move the authority to a multisig or a DAO. For a multisig, use a threshold of at least 2, add a time lock, and do not keep a separate config authority that can change members without a vote.
- Publish the multisig or DAO address on your own website so the page and the on-chain account can be tied together.
How we check: We read the program’s upgrade authority on Solana (public RPC) and recognise Squads, Serum-style multisigs and SPL Governance accounts. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.
- ✕ Not met
Build matches source (OtterSec registry) BLZRi6…
OtterSec registry answered: no build was ever submitted for this program (no submission).What would show up as met
- Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (
solana-verify). - Submit the build to the registry so that it appears in the OtterSec registry (verify.osec.io). The check reads that registry; it does not rebuild anything itself.
How we check: We ask the OtterSec build registry (verify.osec.io, a third party) whether the deployed program matches a build from the public source. We report what the registry says; we do not rebuild or vouch for anything ourselves. Any registry entry that matches the program’s current on-chain hash counts, not only the registry’s default entry (method 0.2.5). This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.
- Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (
- ◐ Partial
Upgrade authority dkpZqr…
Upgrade authority is CdzQ3EsNGEzu5K9w1RG9m1rPW6gbckV823VWDJ9ghkdr: Squads v3 multisig HDiwhb3i… with threshold 5 of 8 voting member(s) (8 total) (established by re-deriving the vault address from the multisig; found in upgrade history tx fF9wNkou…). Member independence not established. Address taken from official source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contractsdocs.mayan.finance ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗ checked 2026-10-21sha256 909528237cb3…sha256 d30e4287c8ab…What would show up as met
- If the program is final, revoke the upgrade authority. It then reads as immutable.
- Otherwise move the authority to a multisig or a DAO. For a multisig, use a threshold of at least 2, add a time lock, and do not keep a separate config authority that can change members without a vote.
- Publish the multisig or DAO address on your own website so the page and the on-chain account can be tied together.
How we check: We read the program’s upgrade authority on Solana (public RPC) and recognise Squads, Serum-style multisigs and SPL Governance accounts. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.
- ✕ Not met
Build matches source (OtterSec registry) dkpZqr…
OtterSec registry answered: no build was ever submitted for this program (no submission).What would show up as met
- Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (
solana-verify). - Submit the build to the registry so that it appears in the OtterSec registry (verify.osec.io). The check reads that registry; it does not rebuild anything itself.
How we check: We ask the OtterSec build registry (verify.osec.io, a third party) whether the deployed program matches a build from the public source. We report what the registry says; we do not rebuild or vouch for anything ourselves. Any registry entry that matches the program’s current on-chain hash counts, not only the registry’s default entry (method 0.2.5). This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.
- Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (
- ◐ Partial
Upgrade authority Gx9riv…
Upgrade authority is CdzQ3EsNGEzu5K9w1RG9m1rPW6gbckV823VWDJ9ghkdr: Squads v3 multisig HDiwhb3i… with threshold 5 of 8 voting member(s) (8 total) (established by re-deriving the vault address from the multisig; found in upgrade history tx 3C5hszJB…). Member independence not established. Address taken from official source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contractsdocs.mayan.finance ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗ checked 2026-10-21sha256 df8609c960cd…sha256 36b8616f40d5…What would show up as met
- If the program is final, revoke the upgrade authority. It then reads as immutable.
- Otherwise move the authority to a multisig or a DAO. For a multisig, use a threshold of at least 2, add a time lock, and do not keep a separate config authority that can change members without a vote.
- Publish the multisig or DAO address on your own website so the page and the on-chain account can be tied together.
How we check: We read the program’s upgrade authority on Solana (public RPC) and recognise Squads, Serum-style multisigs and SPL Governance accounts. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.
- ✕ Not met
Build matches source (OtterSec registry) Gx9riv…
OtterSec registry answered: no build was ever submitted for this program (no submission).What would show up as met
- Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (
solana-verify). - Submit the build to the registry so that it appears in the OtterSec registry (verify.osec.io). The check reads that registry; it does not rebuild anything itself.
How we check: We ask the OtterSec build registry (verify.osec.io, a third party) whether the deployed program matches a build from the public source. We report what the registry says; we do not rebuild or vouch for anything ourselves. Any registry entry that matches the program’s current on-chain hash counts, not only the registry’s default entry (method 0.2.5). This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.
- Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (
- ✕ Not met
Upgrade authority 8QJmxZ…
Upgrade authority is EU8z368kxJ4VzLfdpNG774L6DpAnav9d9cBBpbyH9Rr2: a single key (on-curve address). On Solana, the holder of this key can upgrade the program. Address taken from official source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contractsdocs.mayan.finance ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗ checked 2026-10-21sha256 89565c98d486…sha256 83cf6f5251a6…What would show up as met
- If the program is final, revoke the upgrade authority. It then reads as immutable.
- Otherwise move the authority to a multisig or a DAO. For a multisig, use a threshold of at least 2, add a time lock, and do not keep a separate config authority that can change members without a vote.
- Publish the multisig or DAO address on your own website so the page and the on-chain account can be tied together.
How we check: We read the program’s upgrade authority on Solana (public RPC) and recognise Squads, Serum-style multisigs and SPL Governance accounts. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.
- ✕ Not met
Build matches source (OtterSec registry) 8QJmxZ…
OtterSec registry answered: no build was ever submitted for this program (no submission).What would show up as met
- Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (
solana-verify). - Submit the build to the registry so that it appears in the OtterSec registry (verify.osec.io). The check reads that registry; it does not rebuild anything itself.
How we check: We ask the OtterSec build registry (verify.osec.io, a third party) whether the deployed program matches a build from the public source. We report what the registry says; we do not rebuild or vouch for anything ourselves. Any registry entry that matches the program’s current on-chain hash counts, not only the registry’s default entry (method 0.2.5). This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.
- Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (
- ◐ Partial
Upgrade authority FC4eXx…
Upgrade authority is CdzQ3EsNGEzu5K9w1RG9m1rPW6gbckV823VWDJ9ghkdr: Squads v3 multisig HDiwhb3i… with threshold 5 of 8 voting member(s) (8 total) (established by re-deriving the vault address from the multisig; found in upgrade history tx 3GdRdzmv…). Member independence not established. Address taken from official source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contractsdocs.mayan.finance ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗ checked 2026-10-21sha256 9f580441d4b5…sha256 0722ec1ba514…What would show up as met
- If the program is final, revoke the upgrade authority. It then reads as immutable.
- Otherwise move the authority to a multisig or a DAO. For a multisig, use a threshold of at least 2, add a time lock, and do not keep a separate config authority that can change members without a vote.
- Publish the multisig or DAO address on your own website so the page and the on-chain account can be tied together.
How we check: We read the program’s upgrade authority on Solana (public RPC) and recognise Squads, Serum-style multisigs and SPL Governance accounts. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.
- ✕ Not met
Build matches source (OtterSec registry) FC4eXx…
OtterSec registry answered: no build was ever submitted for this program (no submission).What would show up as met
- Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (
solana-verify). - Submit the build to the registry so that it appears in the OtterSec registry (verify.osec.io). The check reads that registry; it does not rebuild anything itself.
How we check: We ask the OtterSec build registry (verify.osec.io, a third party) whether the deployed program matches a build from the public source. We report what the registry says; we do not rebuild or vouch for anything ourselves. Any registry entry that matches the program’s current on-chain hash counts, not only the registry’s default entry (method 0.2.5). This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.
- Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (
- ◐ Partial
Upgrade authority 5VtQHn…
Upgrade authority is CdzQ3EsNGEzu5K9w1RG9m1rPW6gbckV823VWDJ9ghkdr: Squads v3 multisig HDiwhb3i… with threshold 5 of 8 voting member(s) (8 total) (established by re-deriving the vault address from the multisig; found in upgrade history tx 46k5bmdw…). Member independence not established. Address taken from official source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contractsdocs.mayan.finance ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗ checked 2026-10-21sha256 ac5c5b8c1ae9…sha256 06d84e34a60e…What would show up as met
- If the program is final, revoke the upgrade authority. It then reads as immutable.
- Otherwise move the authority to a multisig or a DAO. For a multisig, use a threshold of at least 2, add a time lock, and do not keep a separate config authority that can change members without a vote.
- Publish the multisig or DAO address on your own website so the page and the on-chain account can be tied together.
How we check: We read the program’s upgrade authority on Solana (public RPC) and recognise Squads, Serum-style multisigs and SPL Governance accounts. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.
- ✕ Not met
Build matches source (OtterSec registry) 5VtQHn…
OtterSec registry answered: no build was ever submitted for this program (no submission).What would show up as met
- Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (
solana-verify). - Submit the build to the registry so that it appears in the OtterSec registry (verify.osec.io). The check reads that registry; it does not rebuild anything itself.
How we check: We ask the OtterSec build registry (verify.osec.io, a third party) whether the deployed program matches a build from the public source. We report what the registry says; we do not rebuild or vouch for anything ourselves. Any registry entry that matches the program’s current on-chain hash counts, not only the registry’s default entry (method 0.2.5). This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.
- Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (
- ✕ Not met
Upgrade authority GFRP4y…
Upgrade authority is 5aaHPox5ZCfxEzxgtzwbEk2DtqMG3JrnnQbqbPuyev6y: a single key (on-curve address). On Solana, the holder of this key can upgrade the program. Address taken from official source: https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contractsdocs.mayan.finance ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗Explorer ↗ checked 2026-10-21sha256 6aeb312f19c9…sha256 ca58acdc5a05…What would show up as met
- If the program is final, revoke the upgrade authority. It then reads as immutable.
- Otherwise move the authority to a multisig or a DAO. For a multisig, use a threshold of at least 2, add a time lock, and do not keep a separate config authority that can change members without a vote.
- Publish the multisig or DAO address on your own website so the page and the on-chain account can be tied together.
How we check: We read the program’s upgrade authority on Solana (public RPC) and recognise Squads, Serum-style multisigs and SPL Governance accounts. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.
- ✕ Not met
Build matches source (OtterSec registry) GFRP4y…
OtterSec registry answered: no build was ever submitted for this program (no submission).What would show up as met
- Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (
solana-verify). - Submit the build to the registry so that it appears in the OtterSec registry (verify.osec.io). The check reads that registry; it does not rebuild anything itself.
How we check: We ask the OtterSec build registry (verify.osec.io, a third party) whether the deployed program matches a build from the public source. We report what the registry says; we do not rebuild or vouch for anything ourselves. Any registry entry that matches the program’s current on-chain hash counts, not only the registry’s default entry (method 0.2.5). This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.
- Build the program reproducibly from your public source with the Solana verifiable-build tooling (
- – N/A
Mint/freeze authority
No token mint submitted.source: calculated from the other checks checked 2026-10-21
Audits weight 1515/15
- ✓ Met
Audits found at official sources
Discovered automatically (method 0.2.2): page https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/audits names OtterSec, Sec3. Rated partial: found at the project's own GitHub organisation or website and naming OtterSec, Sec3, but the program ID was not found in the readable text (PDF text is parsed when possible). Date vs. last upgrade not checked. Quality, scope and findings not assessed. Searched: GitHub mayan-finance: 15 of 15 non-fork repositories file-listed via GitHub API | mayan.finance: 19 audit/security page address(es) fetched (docs sub-domains and homepage audit links included). Counted as Met (method 0.2.4): audits by at least 2 distinct firms (ottersec, sec3) were found at official sources of the project; the program ID is not required in that case. Quality, scope and date still not assessed.
Code openness weight 15 · 1 not read15/15
- ✓ Met
Public repository
mayan-finance/swap-sdk public, created 2022-10-14, 9 contributor(s) (count only).GitHub ↗api.github.com ↗api.github.com ↗api.github.com ↗ checked 2026-10-21sha256 22890e757b7e…sha256 714e3b360bab… - ✓ Met
Licence
SPDX: MIT.GitHub ↗api.github.com ↗api.github.com ↗api.github.com ↗ checked 2026-10-21sha256 22890e757b7e…sha256 714e3b360bab… - ✓ Met
Activity last 90 days
Last push 2026-10-20 (0 d ago), latest across the mayan-finance organisation's non-fork repositories.GitHub ↗api.github.com ↗api.github.com ↗api.github.com ↗ checked 2026-10-21sha256 22890e757b7e…sha256 714e3b360bab… - ⊘ Not read
On-chain program source public
Program ID not found in the submitted repo or the security.txt source_code repo. Source may exist elsewhere — counted as unknown, not as closed. Repos searched (shallow clone, text search for the program ID): https://github.com/https://github.com/mayan-finance (clone failed). Does not prove the deployed binary matches (see the build check). (reason: unreadable)What would show up as met
Nothing for the project to do. Our checker could not read the source this time, so the check is “Not read”: no points are lost. It is tried again at the next run. If you think the data behind it is wrong, send a correction.
Onchain history weight 1010/10
- ✓ Met
Last deploy mayan3…
Last deploy 2026-07-10 (102 d ago).Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21sha256 2f6902d1e0e8…sha256 ad30e907252b… - ○ Not built
Program age / upgrade count mayan3…
Full history scan (first deploy, upgrades in 30 d, authority changes) needs an indexer (e.g. Helius); not available on public RPC.Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21sha256 2f6902d1e0e8…sha256 ad30e907252b… - ✓ Met
Last deploy BLZRi6…
Last deploy 2025-11-23 (331 d ago).Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21sha256 0c0d7de493c1…sha256 0c2b99f92d4b… - ○ Not built
Program age / upgrade count BLZRi6…
Full history scan (first deploy, upgrades in 30 d, authority changes) needs an indexer (e.g. Helius); not available on public RPC.Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21sha256 0c0d7de493c1…sha256 0c2b99f92d4b… - ✓ Met
Last deploy dkpZqr…
Last deploy 2025-10-07 (378 d ago).Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21sha256 909528237cb3…sha256 d30e4287c8ab… - ○ Not built
Program age / upgrade count dkpZqr…
Full history scan (first deploy, upgrades in 30 d, authority changes) needs an indexer (e.g. Helius); not available on public RPC.Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21sha256 909528237cb3…sha256 d30e4287c8ab… - ✓ Met
Last deploy Gx9riv…
Last deploy 2025-12-06 (318 d ago).Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21sha256 df8609c960cd…sha256 36b8616f40d5… - ○ Not built
Program age / upgrade count Gx9riv…
Full history scan (first deploy, upgrades in 30 d, authority changes) needs an indexer (e.g. Helius); not available on public RPC.Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21sha256 df8609c960cd…sha256 36b8616f40d5… - ✓ Met
Last deploy 8QJmxZ…
Last deploy 2025-06-29 (478 d ago).Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getBlockTime)OtterSec registry ↗ checked 2026-10-21sha256 89565c98d486…sha256 83cf6f5251a6… - ○ Not built
Program age / upgrade count 8QJmxZ…
Full history scan (first deploy, upgrades in 30 d, authority changes) needs an indexer (e.g. Helius); not available on public RPC.Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getBlockTime)OtterSec registry ↗ checked 2026-10-21sha256 89565c98d486…sha256 83cf6f5251a6… - ✓ Met
Last deploy FC4eXx…
Last deploy 2025-07-23 (455 d ago).Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21sha256 9f580441d4b5…sha256 0722ec1ba514… - ○ Not built
Program age / upgrade count FC4eXx…
Full history scan (first deploy, upgrades in 30 d, authority changes) needs an indexer (e.g. Helius); not available on public RPC.Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21sha256 9f580441d4b5…sha256 0722ec1ba514… - ✓ Met
Last deploy 5VtQHn…
Last deploy 2026-07-28 (84 d ago).Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21sha256 ac5c5b8c1ae9…sha256 06d84e34a60e… - ○ Not built
Program age / upgrade count 5VtQHn…
Full history scan (first deploy, upgrades in 30 d, authority changes) needs an indexer (e.g. Helius); not available on public RPC.Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getSignaturesForAddress)RPC call (getTransaction) checked 2026-10-21sha256 ac5c5b8c1ae9…sha256 06d84e34a60e… - ✓ Met
Last deploy GFRP4y…
Last deploy 2026-08-31 (51 d ago).Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getBlockTime)OtterSec registry ↗ checked 2026-10-21sha256 6aeb312f19c9…sha256 ca58acdc5a05… - ○ Not built
Program age / upgrade count GFRP4y…
Full history scan (first deploy, upgrades in 30 d, authority changes) needs an indexer (e.g. Helius); not available on public RPC.Explorer ↗RPC call (getAccountInfo)RPC call (getBlockTime)OtterSec registry ↗ checked 2026-10-21sha256 6aeb312f19c9…sha256 ca58acdc5a05…
Team & contact weight 15 · 1 unknown5/15
- ✕ Not met
Security contact (security.txt)
No valid security.txt at /.well-known/security.txt or /security.txt (404).What would show up as met
- Publish a text file at https://your-domain/.well-known/security.txt (or /security.txt) with a
Contact:line, for exampleContact: mailto:security@your-domain. - RFC 9116 also asks for an
Expires:line. We look only forContact:, but addExpires:too so the file stays correct.
How we check: We fetch the two standard locations over HTTPS. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.
- Publish a text file at https://your-domain/.well-known/security.txt (or /security.txt) with a
- ? Unknown
Bug bounty programme linked
No bug-bounty link found on homepage (raw + rendered), sitemap or security.txt. Not checked deeper (docs sites, Immunefi search) — counted as unknown, not as missing. Also checked: Immunefi public list: no active programme matched; no on-chain security.txt in mayan3…; no on-chain security.txt in BLZRi6…; no on-chain security.txt in dkpZqr…; no on-chain security.txt in Gx9riv…; no on-chain security.txt in 8QJmxZ…; no on-chain security.txt in FC4eXx…; no on-chain security.txt in 5VtQHn…; no on-chain security.txt in GFRP4y….mayan.finance ↗mayan.finance ↗mayan.finance ↗mayan.finance ↗ checked 2026-10-21sha256 0ad342902d30…sha256 e290fff99da6…What would show up as met
- Link your bug bounty (for example an Immunefi, HackerOne or Cantina page, or a /bug-bounty page of your own) from the homepage, the sitemap or your security.txt.
- “Unknown” here means we found no link. It does not mean you have no programme.
How we check: We look at the homepage links (also as rendered in a browser), sitemap.xml and security.txt, and at Immunefi’s public list for on-chain security.txt names. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.
- ℹ Status only
Claimed / not claimed
Status only, not scored: claiming proves control of an authority, domain or GitHub organisation and never changes a score. The status is shown in the page header.source: calculated from the other checks checked 2026-10-21 - ○ Not built
Team declared (voluntary, with consent)
Team declaration + consent flow not built — excluded.source: calculated from the other checks checked 2026-10-21 - ℹ Status only
Components declared complete by the project
Status only, not scored (it used to be scored, which made pages that are not claimed systematically lower; removed 2026-10-15). Other programs/packages may exist that were not submitted.source: calculated from the other checks checked 2026-10-21 - ✕ Not met
Program embeds security.txt
0/8 own program(s) embed a solana-security-txt block with contacts.What would show up as met
- Embed a security.txt block in the program with the
solana-security-txtcrate: name, project_url, contacts and policy. Redeploy to publish it. - This also tells us which programs belong to you, and which are shared programs that do not.
How we check: We read the program account on Solana (public RPC). This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.
- Embed a security.txt block in the program with the
- ✓ Met
Official program address list
mayan3… published on project domain (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); BLZRi6… published on project domain (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); dkpZqr… published on project domain (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); Gx9riv… published on project domain (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); 8QJmxZ… published on project domain (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); FC4eXx… published on project domain (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); 5VtQHn… published on project domain (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); GFRP4y… published on project domain (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts).
Legal documents weight 1010/10
- ✓ Met
Terms & privacy policy present
Terms: https://mayan.finance/terms-of-use; privacy: https://mayan.finance/privacy-policy (homepage links, sitemap.xml, common paths). Content not assessed.mayan.finance ↗mayan.finance ↗mayan.finance ↗mayan.finance ↗ checked 2026-10-21sha256 0ad342902d30…sha256 e290fff99da6… - ○ Not built
Registered legal entity
Not stated.source: calculated from the other checks checked 2026-10-21 - ✓ Met
Legal entity named in terms
Terms/privacy text names “Sand Lake Labs, Ltd” (https://mayan.finance/terms-of-use). Not checked against a company registry.
Domain weight 54.4/5
- ✓ Met
HTTPS
https://mayan.finance answered HTTP 200 over TLS.mayan.finance ↗mayan.finance ↗mayan.finance ↗mayan.finance ↗ checked 2026-10-21sha256 0ad342902d30…sha256 e290fff99da6… - ◐ Partial
Security headers
Present: X-Content-Type-Options. Missing: HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options.mayan.finance ↗mayan.finance ↗mayan.finance ↗mayan.finance ↗ checked 2026-10-21sha256 0ad342902d30…sha256 e290fff99da6…What would show up as met
- Send these four response headers on your homepage: Strict-Transport-Security, Content-Security-Policy, X-Content-Type-Options and X-Frame-Options.
- The check looks only at whether each header is present, not how strict it is.
How we check: We read the headers of one homepage request. This is what the check looks for. It makes no promise about a score or grade, and claiming or paying never changes a score.
- ✓ Met
Domain age
Registered 2022-01-17 (~1737 d), source: RDAP (rdap.org). Registrant data ignored. - ✓ Met
Domain ↔ components consistency
Linked: address mayan3… published on mayan.finance (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); address BLZRi6… published on mayan.finance (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); address dkpZqr… published on mayan.finance (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); address Gx9riv… published on mayan.finance (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); address 8QJmxZ… published on mayan.finance (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); address FC4eXx… published on mayan.finance (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); address 5VtQHn… published on mayan.finance (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); address GFRP4y… published on mayan.finance (https://docs.mayan.finance/resources/chains-contracts); GitHub repo linked from homepage; GitHub org name matches domain (weak)source: calculated from the other checks checked 2026-10-21
Snapshot hash of monitored fields: f504e9cfba853732
AI summaries
Generated with Grok 4.7 (xAI), Claude sonnet-5-5 (Anthropic) and GPT-6.1-sol (OpenAI) via their APIs. xAI, Anthropic and OpenAI have not reviewed, approved or sponsored Recheckable. AI-generated text; models see only extracted check results, never project-supplied text or personal names. They do not affect the score. Some text on this site (summaries and reports) is AI-generated and labelled where it appears. Scores and check results come from fixed code, not from AI. Scores are produced automatically from public data and are not reviewed by hand before they are shown; cases that the automatic checks flag are held for a person.
Template summary (deterministic)
Onchain track: band C (64/100, coverage 95 %, onchain v0.2.7). Strongest: Audits, Code openness, Onchain history, Legal documents, Domain. Weakest: Contract control, Team & contact. 1 check(s) unknown (each costs 1.5 points); 1 not read (no points lost, lowers coverage); 10 not built yet (excluded).
Regulatory information
The project has not declared any regulated-activity types, so no rules are listed.
Law firms (free listing, alphabetical, no ranking)
- Delphi — Stockholm, Blockchain law (self-described)
- Gernandt & Danielsson — Stockholm, Fintech (self-described)
- Magnusson — Stockholm, Fintech (self-described)
- Mannheimer Swartling — Stockholm, Fintech (own practice page to be confirmed) (self-described)
- Setterwalls — Stockholm, Fintech (self-described)
- Vinge — Stockholm, MiCA (own practice page to be confirmed) (self-described)
Recheckable has no financial relationship with the listed firms and receives no fee per contact. Paid placements, if ever introduced, are marked “Ad” and never shown next to low scores.
Score history
Automated score at each published review, newest on the right. The line steps at the date of a review; between reviews the score is unchanged.
Solid line: offchain track. Dashed line: onchain track. ◆ = the method changed at that review.
◆ 2026-10-17: the scoring method changed from v0.2.1 to v0.2.5. A score change at that point can come from the method and not from the project.
◆ 2026-10-19: the scoring method changed from v0.2.5 to v0.2.6. A score change at that point can come from the method and not from the project.
◆ 2026-10-21: the scoring method changed from v0.2.6 to v0.2.7. A score change at that point can come from the method and not from the project.
Data table
| Review | Track | Score | Grade | Coverage | Method |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-16 | offchain | 30/100 | no grade | 67 % | v0.2.1 |
| 2026-10-16 | onchain | 44/100 | D | 95 % | v0.2.1 |
| 2026-10-17 | onchain | 58/100 | C | 95 % | v0.2.5 |
| 2026-10-19 | onchain | 58/100 | C | 95 % | v0.2.6 |
| 2026-10-20 | onchain | 64/100 | C | 95 % | v0.2.6 |
| 2026-10-21 | onchain | 64/100 | C | 95 % | v0.2.7 |
Check changes between reviews
- 2026-10-21 · onchain Upgrade authority mayan3…: Not met → Partial method changed docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-21 · onchain Upgrade authority BLZRi6…: Not met → Partial method changed docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-21 · onchain Upgrade authority dkpZqr…: Not met → Partial method changed docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-21 · onchain Upgrade authority Gx9riv…: Not met → Partial method changed docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-21 · onchain Upgrade authority FC4eXx…: Not met → Partial method changed docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-21 · onchain Upgrade authority 5VtQHn…: Not met → Partial method changed docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-20 · onchain Upgrade authority mayan3…: Not met → Partial docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-20 · onchain Upgrade authority BLZRi6…: Not met → Partial docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-20 · onchain Upgrade authority dkpZqr…: Not met → Partial docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-20 · onchain Upgrade authority Gx9riv…: Not met → Partial docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-20 · onchain Upgrade authority FC4eXx…: Not met → Partial docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-20 · onchain Upgrade authority 5VtQHn…: Not met → Partial docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-20 · onchain Licence: Not met → Met GitHub ↗
- 2026-10-19 · onchain Upgrade authority mayan3…: Not met → Partial method changed docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-19 · onchain Upgrade authority BLZRi6…: Not met → Partial method changed docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-19 · onchain Upgrade authority dkpZqr…: Not met → Partial method changed docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-19 · onchain Upgrade authority Gx9riv…: Not met → Partial method changed docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-19 · onchain Upgrade authority FC4eXx…: Not met → Partial method changed docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-19 · onchain Upgrade authority 5VtQHn…: Not met → Partial method changed docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-17 · onchain Upgrade authority mayan3…: Not met → Partial method changed docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-17 · onchain Upgrade authority BLZRi6…: Not met → Partial method changed docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-17 · onchain Upgrade authority dkpZqr…: Not met → Partial method changed docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-17 · onchain Upgrade authority Gx9riv…: Not met → Partial method changed docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-17 · onchain Upgrade authority FC4eXx…: Not met → Partial method changed docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-17 · onchain Upgrade authority 5VtQHn…: Not met → Partial method changed docs.mayan.finance ↗ Explorer ↗
- 2026-10-17 · onchain Audits found at official sources: Not met → Met method changed docs.mayan.finance ↗
History
- 2026-10-21 06:49Forced fresh run (same result; fresh evidence snapshots): onchain C (64, coverage 95 %)
- 2026-10-20 20:39Nightly re-run: onchain C (64, coverage 95 %)
- 2026-10-19 13:34Forced fresh run (same result; fresh evidence snapshots): onchain C (58, coverage 95 %)
- 2026-10-18 08:10Method 0.2.4: audits by 2+ distinct firms at official sources count as Met; an unreadable token mint is Not read. Re-scored from the stored checks, no new data.
- 2026-10-17 06:19Nightly re-run: onchain C (51, coverage 95 %)
- 2026-10-16 14:25Nightly re-run: onchain D (44, coverage 95 %)
- 2026-10-16 12:59Initial automatic review (indexed): offchain insufficient data (30, coverage 67 %)
Project's own statements and reply
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